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Abstract 
This paper addresses an important contemporary issue; namely the implementation of the 
Basel Accord worldwide. The Basel Accord provides a series of measures to improve the stability of 
the world’s financial system but its implementation poses a number of challenges for both developing 
and emerging economies. Pakistan faces a number of unique challenges in this regard due to its recent 
economic expansion and the fact that the rate at which the Basel Accord is being adopted lags behind 
that of other countries. This paper throws light on this and a number of related issues due to a 
combination of the novelty of the survey data from risk managers coupled with a rigorous statistical 
analysis. Results reflect that the Basel Accord is generally well regarded due to its underlying aims of 
improved capital standards and a scientific treatment of risk. However, operational risk emerges as a 
key barrier to implementation in Pakistan. A number of further obstacles are highlighted, which, do 
seem to have been addressed although only with a partial degree of success. Privately owned banks 
appear to be more technically competent and more favourably disposed towards implementation than 
publicly owned banks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As evidenced by the recent financial crisis, the global banking industry is becoming 
increasingly complex and risky. The main causes for such leveraged banking are international 
financial deregulation, product and technological innovation and above all the integration of global 
financial markets (Sahajwala and Van den Bergh, 2000). Such accelerations have led to banks 
upgrading the methodologies and procedures used to gauge and administer their risks (Carauana, 
2004). The Basel Accord has thus emerged as an attempt to secure stability in financial systems and 
structures by using a set of rules which are acceptable in all global financial hubs and allow for a 
scientific treatment of risk. As part of the Accord banks face a number of minimum capital 
requirements. Such rules are advantageous to the economy as they cushion banks against losses 
resulting from credit, operational and market risk exposures and ensure the availability of capital in 
the economy throughout business cycles (BIS, 2004; Hassan Al-Tamimi, 2008). Tying banks to 
prescribed capital limits also guards against systemic risk (Amidu, 2007).  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was formed in 1974 by G10 central 
bankers under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) following the collapse of 
Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany and Franklin National Bank in the United States in 1974. (BIS, 2008; 
Engelen, 2005). The committee introduced its first Basel Accord, known as Basel I, in 1988. The 
main purpose of the Accord was to protect global banking systems from the affects of financial crises. 
The landmark achievement of this Accord was the acceptance of this principle and the establishment 
of minimum capital requirements of banks (Makwiramiti, 2008). Basel I attempted to address bank 
capitalization, alongside other inconsistencies in the banking environment, by primarily focussing 
upon Credit Risk. The second Basel Accord, Basel II, supplemented the original agreement by setting 
new minimal capital requirements, again based on risk profiling, but also introducing two new pillars: 
supervisory review and market discipline. Basel II was very short-lived in relation to its predecessor 
as it was promulgated during the onset of the global financial crisis. In response to a number of 
failings in Basel II, which came to light during the crisis, a further modification, Basel III, was 
initiated in 2010.   
Conservative Risk Management is the hallmark of the Basel II framework for mobilizing 
financial stability across banking sectors worldwide (BCBS, 2006). This framework built on the basic 
premise of capital management as suggested by Basel I in 1988, but provided improved parameters, 
reflecting a clearer formulation of risks facing the banking sector and a mechanism for protecting 
banks against risk in a more methodical and scientific manner. Although primarily designed for G10 
countries however, the Accord was structured in such a way that it could be applied across the world 
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equivalently in developed and developing countries (Mboweni, 2004). This was desirable because the 
Accord seeks to align capital adequacy of banks with the range of risks stemming from its various 
assets. In principle, this enables the Basel Accord to manage developments in the banking field 
pertaining to new financial instruments and financial technologies (Mboweni, 2004). 
The Basel Accord re-engineered the organizational structures and processes of the supervisors 
and the banking sectors all around the world (Mboweni, 2004). The key to the effective and improved 
risk management under the Accord is its proper implementation (AIF: Disclosure Subcommittee, 
2004). Accordingly, in order to have effective implementation around the world, co-operation 
between global supervisors and the respective institutions plays a pivotal role (Global Risk Regulator, 
2005). The primary purpose of the Basel Accord is therefore to promulgate the three pillars of Basel II 
by rationalizing banks’ risk appetite according to their residual resources, thus forming the basis of a 
sound banking structure.  
In Pakistan banks are regulated by the Banking Supervision Department of the State Bank of 
Pakistan. It has set-up a road map for the implementation of Basel Accord which attempts to comply 
with Basel Accord Implementation guidelines issued by the BCBS. With the growth of international 
banking and the entrance of multinational banks into Pakistan’s Banking Sector the diversity of the 
domestic Banking Sector has increased. This has also increased the public availability of banking 
services matching international standards. These developments have changed the nature of the risks 
facing the Pakistani banking system – risks that the very promulgation of the Basel Accord was 
intended to address. The multi-layered structure of the Basel Accord - and different levels of adoption 
around the world – creates further confusion. In Pakistan, it was originally intended that the Basel 
Accord would be implemented in full before December 31
st
 2009. However, the State Bank of 
Pakistan extended the dates for implementation for various special circumstances that the Pakistani 
Banking Sector faces. The fact that Pakistan’s implementation of the Basel Accord lags behind that of 
other countries is also significant (see Section 3). There is thus a need to investigate the reasons 
behind this from a local perspective, over and above the international reasons stemming from the 
international banking crisis. In this regard research needs to be undertaken focusing upon the 
following issues:  
 
 Compliance to the timetable introduced by the Supervisory Authorities; 
 Problems faced by both the State Bank of Pakistan and individual banks; 
 The present and proposed infrastructure available with the Basel Accord for smooth and 
successful implementation; 
 HR capabilities; 
 The impact the Basel Accord has upon bank exposures to credit, market and operational risks. 
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This paper will explore various aspects of Basel Accord Implementation in Pakistan, thus clarifying 
the inability of Pakistani Banks to adopt the advanced techniques in the Accord.  Previous studies 
have looked at the impact of implementation of the Basel Accord in a number of different countries 
including the United States, Brazil, Switzerland, India, Lebanon and South Africa (Jacobsohn, 2004; 
Cumming and Nel, 2005). However, no such study has yet been conducted in Pakistan. Further, most 
of these studies were conducted prior to the introduction of the Second Accord. It is therefore of 
interest to undertake a fresh study into the implementation of the Basel II Accord in Pakistan, both 
due to the timing (after Basel II and following the recent financial crisis and the subsequent 
commencement of Basel III) and due to the unique set of circumstances facing the Pakistan banking 
sector following its recent expansion.  
 The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the Basel Accord in its various 
incarnations and highlights a number of pertinent background issues regarding implementation.  
Section 3 discusses international comparisons and the implementation of the Basel Accord in more 
detail. Section 4 discusses the survey methodology. Section 5 introduces the statistical methodology 
used and gives the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The Basel Accord 
 
2.1 Basel I 
 
Basel I was first introduced in the 1988, with minimum capital requirements set at 8% of risk 
adjusted assets. The Accord was accepted all over the world by over 100 countries and Engelen 
(2005) points to its general acceptance by most of the banks globally since 1988. The adoption of 
Basel I in a significant number of countries across the world improved the resilience of the 
international banking system through improved capital standards (Rime, 2001; Cumming and Nel, 
2005). The Basel Accord was formulated in response to the 1970s financial crisis, with the 
expectation that appropriate capital levels would help reduce systemic risk, with individual financial 
institutions better able to withstand all losses in general and credit loss in particular (Dobson and 
Hufbauer, 2001). 
However, despite providing some stability to the financial sector Ong (2004) criticized the Accord 
for a ―one size fits all‖ approach to risk management, being insensitive to the distinction between 
credit and other risks (Hai et al., 2007). Further, the introduction of new financial derivatives and the 
increased globalization and integration of world financial markets necessitated further revision (Hai et 
al., 2007). Regulations also led to banks ―cherry picking‖ certain practices, providing leverage to 
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banks who then created high-risk portfolios of assets within particular risk categories (Cumming and 
Nel, 2005). 
 
2.2 Basel II 
The primary objective of Basel II was to guarantee the solidity of the financial system by ensuring 
that banks are appropriately and proportionately capitalized with respect to a number of different risk 
factors. The Accord takes the form of three pillars; Minimal Capital Requirements, Supervisory 
Review and Market Discipline. The First Pillar, Minimal Capital Requirements, extended the key 
feature of Basel I – measurement of risk and alignment with regulatory capital (Bailey, 2005) - but 
extended the definition of risk to include credit risk, market risk and operational risk. 
Credit Risk can be measured in two different ways: the Standardized Approach (SA) and the 
Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach. The IRB approach enables banks to use internal estimates of 
borrower creditworthiness in order to gauge future losses. Under the IRB approach two different 
possibilities of varying complexity are possible. Under the Foundation IRB (FIRB) approach banks 
compute estimates of the probability of default (PD) of respective borrowers and in the next step their 
supervisors in the respective regions complement this estimate with other appropriate inputs. 
Alternatively, using an Advanced IRB (AIRB) approach banks may use the probability of default 
(PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and maturity (M) to compute credit risk 
(BCBS, 2006). 
In addition to refining the measurement of Credit Risk, Basel II also established that banks should 
allocate a proportion of capital for operational risk. This enhances the scope of Basel II because it 
requires banks to gauge the likely extent of losses from failed or inadequate internal processes, 
systems, and employee errors relative to external factors. To measure operational risk three different 
approaches were introduced: the basic indicator approach, the standardized approach and the 
internal measurement approach.   
Basel II also specifies capital charges for banks’ Market Risk exposures based upon their risk of 
loss stemming from on and off balance sheet positions due to volatility in market prices. Such risks 
include Interest Rate Risk, Foreign Exchange Risk and Commodities Risk. Basel II also specified 
prudent guidelines for the valuation of positions in the trading book. These consist of the provision of 
adequate systems and control, valuation methodologies of marking to market and marking to model, 
independent price verifications and valuation adjustment and reserves. The valuation methodologies 
involve actual measurement of market risk using either the Standardized Measurement Method or the 
Internal Models Approach.  
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Supervisory Review forms the second pillar of Basel II and is intended to ensure that banks 
have sufficient resources to undertake their internal risk assessment (BCBS, 2006). The Basel Accord 
dictates that all banks under their jurisdiction have systems and processes available for their capital 
adequacy assessment (BCBS, 2001). In doing so the Accord suggested that banks develop their 
assessment procedures and that the calculation of capital targets is continuously updated and remains 
in line with capital adequacy requirements (BCBS, 2001). Supervisors were also given powers to 
decide if banks are to hold higher capital levels over and above the 8% originally prescribed in Pillar 
I. Furthermore, supervisors were also given the authority to intervene in risk management procedures, 
revising and upgrading procedures and processes as and when they deemed necessary (BCBS, 2001).  
The third pillar of market discipline emphasized the improvement of bank management by 
ensuring full disclosure, lucidity and clarity in public reporting.  The main aim of this pillar is to 
increase the disclosure of capital adequacy in banks via their public reports (BCBS, 2006). This pillar 
clarifies issues already raised in (BCBS, 2001) which stated that market participants can only gauge 
the capital adequacy risk profiles of the banks if the reporting banks comply with the enhanced levels 
of market discipline (BCBS, 2001). In this way, by monitoring the activities of the banks and their 
ability to administer its exposure to risk, market participants will be in a position to reward banks that 
conservatively administer their risks, simultaneously penalizing those that fail to do so (Makwiramiti, 
2008).  
Initially, the Basel Accord was developed for internationally participating banks. However, it 
can equally be applied to banks with varying levels of complexity (BCBS, 2001). The Accord 
provides a principled framework for the treatment of risk coupled with supervisory review, hence 
adding increased flexibility in the calculation of risk and respective capital levels. Thus, the Accord 
has also contributed towards improvements in corporate governance and transparency (Makwiramiti, 
2008). Other added benefits of the Basel Accord include improved regulatory framework, applications 
and processes. The advantages of Basel II can be categorized in the loan, portfolio, and organizational 
levels as laid out in Skosana Risk Management Company (2006). 
The global financial crisis highlighted a number of key failings in Basel II. These include 
over-estimates of common equity and a failure to distinguish between simple and complex positions 
in Trading Book Exposures. Basel II also overlooks issues of leverage, macro-prudential stability (the 
impact banks have on the financial system as a whole) and systemic risk. In response, some of these 
obvious failings have begun to be addressed in a third accord - Basel III. A useful overview of Basel 
III is contained in Folpmers (2010). A number of modifications were made to minimum capital 
requirements calculations including more conservative micro-prudential and macro-prudential capital 
rules. Additional requirements, based on liquidity ratios, were also introduced to counter banks 
building up excessive leverage with an insufficient liquidity cushion.   
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3. Implementation of the Basel Accord: international comparisons 
 
There is a clear majority opinion that the implementation of the Basel Accord should result in 
increased financial stability as it provides risk-sensitive methodologies (BIS, 1999; BCBS, 2004; 
Cumming and Nel, 2005; van Rixtel, et al. 2004; Jacobsohn, 2004). Whilst the Basel Accord was 
primarily designed for G10 countries, and not for developing countries, it was nonetheless structured 
in such a way that it could be applied across the world in both developed and developing countries 
(Mboweni, 2004). However, it is reasonable to expect that the Accord will not be adopted across the 
world at the same time as banks in developing and emerging economies will have to work harder to 
meet international practices and procedures (Dupuis, 2006).  
There a number of further issues which may limit the effectiveness of the Basel Accord. 
Crucially, Basel II failed to account for the effects of an international financial crisis – leading directly 
to the promulgation of a third Accord Basel III. There are procyclicality issues (IMF, 2005), which 
may aggravate instabilities in the banking system and, by their nature, may have more pronounced 
effects upon developing countries (Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 2001; Reisen, 2001; Ward, 2002). In 
economic downturns, increased risks lead to increased capital charges. These increases in the cost of 
capital may then lead to a contraction in the rate of bank lending. Economic distress may thus be 
transferred from the financial sector to the real economy (Jacobsohn, 2004; Heid, 2003). There are 
two further issues, namely potential clashes between international and local financial standards and 
credit risk management issues resulting from the use of rating agencies. This first scenario arises 
when the home country of a bank requires higher IRB approaches than the host country prescribes due 
to limitations in supervisory capacity. Regarding credit risk, rating agencies can manipulate Credit 
Risk Management in developing countries (IMF, 2005). Such companies can prescribe risk-weights 
for assets that can provide biased incentives for implementing standardized approaches in Pillar I. 
There is thus a need on the part of the supervisors of the respective countries to oversee the work of 
Rating Agencies.  
The success of the Basel Accord, and the speed of its implementation, thus depends critically on 
the resource constraints of financial regulators across the world (Cornford, 2006). We review the 
effects of such measures in South Africa, India, Switzerland, Brazil, Jordan, USA and Pakistan. As 
discussed below the international experience varies greatly.  
Prior to the introduction of the Basel Accord South Africa, the government worked for around 11 
years to ensure that a number of fiscal and macroeconomic preconditions were met. Basel II was 
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finally implemented across the banking sector uniformly from January 2008 (Neville, 2005). In 
contrast, in India the pace of transition to the Basel Accord is very slow (Mehra, 2010). By December 
2010 Indian banks were still following initial approaches, with a Reserve Bank of India notification 
stating that more advanced approaches are to be implemented from 2013. 
 In Switzerland, although all major banks started to apply approaches by the year 2006, it was 
mainly only the large internationally active banks that had the resources to apply methodologies like 
IRB (Swiss Federal Banking Commission, 2005). Similar to South Africa, Switzerland opted to 
integrate all three pillars into its regulatory system and adopted all the approaches available in the 
Basel II framework. There were no alterations made to the methodologies for credit, operational and 
market risks (Swiss Federal Banking Commission, 2005), although the Swiss implementation allows 
for two additional ways of calculating credit risk – the Swiss Standard Approach for domestic banks 
and the International Standard Approach for international banks. The initial approaches were 
introduced by January 2007 with more advanced methodologies coming into force by January 2008. 
This double paced time schedule allowed banks enough time for a smooth transition (Makwirmaiti, 
2008). In Brazil, the first implementations of the Basel Accord were due to commence in 2004, later 
postponed to 2007. The process of implementation is expected to be completed in 2013, with the 
Central Bank of Brazil having put in place a detailed timetable for full implementation. In contrast, 
implementation of Basel Accord in Jordon is not at an advanced stage. Jordanian banks have met a 
number of preconditions for the Basel Accord. However, the existence of supervisory Authority is 
questionable, as no mechanism for external rating of credit exposures exists, thus compromising the 
integrity of the whole process (Barakat, 2009). 
In terms of its adoption of the Basel Accord the United States formed a two-step ladder for its 
financial institutions. The US outlined specific criteria assigning the Basel I Accord for non-core 
Banks and the Basel II Accord for core Banks (Federal Reserve Board, 2007). Accordingly in the 
USA all such banks which opt for Basel II Accord are obliged to promulgate advanced approaches for 
capital allocations in their banks (Federal Reserve Board, 2007; Gordon-Hart, 2004). However, the 
recent financial crisis disturbed the path of implementation and many attempts to even out the two-
step ladder approach have been scuppered. Currently, Basel III does not seem to constitute a major 
issue for US Banks as they appear to be more cushioned in terms of liquidity, leverage and buffer 
requirements (Folpmers, 2010). However, there are still deliberations under way about how to phase 
in the implementation of Basel III in line with international standards.  
In Pakistan, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has taken several steps towards the implementation 
of the Basel Accord. In 2005 the SBP set the following schedule: 
 Standardized Approach for credit risk and Basic indicator / Standardized Approach for 
operational risk from 1st January 2008. 
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 Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach from 1st January 2010. Banks wishing to adopt the 
Internal Ratings Based Approach for capital requirements against credit risk before 1st 
January 2010 may approach SBP for the purpose. Their request will be considered on case-to-
case basis.  
According to annual reports submitted by banks in Pakistan, none have yet adopted Advanced 
Internal Ratings Based Approaches which were supposed to be implemented by the Banking sector 
from the 1
st
 of January 2010. Thus, Pakistan has already lagged behind by more than a year in its 
implementation of the Basel Accord. Since Pakistan has made less progress than other countries it is 
therefore of interest to determine the reasons for the failure to comply with the original schedule and 
to identify potential further barriers to implementation. 
 
4. Survey methodology 
 
This study has been conducted in order to study obstacles to the implementation of the Basel 
Accord in Pakistan. The questionnaire used for our study has been adopted from the Basel Accord 
implementation of the Bank of Serbia and has been specially amended for the purpose of our study. 
The final Questionnaire has 52 questions:    
 Questions about the risk profile of bank and the functional profile of respondents; 
 Questions about the aptitude of the respective bank and their IT and HR resource availability 
regarding implementation of the Basel Accord; 
 Questions about the risks covered in the First Pillar and efforts made by the bank to adopt 
advanced approaches to risk management. 
 Questions about the Second Pillar of Basel Accord  - Supervisory Review; 
 Questions about the Third Pillar of Basel Accord - Market Discipline. 
Questionnaires are required in studies which involve eliciting information about a 
phenomenon where patterns, frequency and success of adoption are not known (Taylor-Powell, 1998; 
Taylor-Powell and Hermann, 2000). The fact that our research questions concern contemporary issues 
regarding the inability of Banks to implement the advanced methodologies of the Basel Accord 
further necessitates use of a questionnaire. Results are thus gathered in a  standardized and objective 
way, from a non-trivial proportion of the target population and in a quick and efficient manner. 
There are currently around 38 banks operating in Pakistan. From these we have collected data 
from 5 key personnel from 12 of these 38 banks. These 12 banks own about 70% of market share both 
in Deposit and Asset categories. Further, the banks in our study have been selected with different 
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ownership types and Capital Adequacy Ratios (CARs) showing different patterns – some are 
increasing over time, some are decreasing. Summary statistics of banks in the sample are shown in 
Table 1. CARs calculated from published annual accounts are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of banks in the sample. 
 
Data Source: *Annual Financial Statements are Available on the Website of State Bank of Pakistan. 
       : **Average of response of all survey respondents in each bank  
         ***Bank of Punjab has not been issuing its Annual reports for the last two years due to 
Capital Adequacy problems (with the Permission of State Bank of Pakistan). The figures listed are 
expected figures as obtained from survey respondents 
 
 
 
 
Name of the 
Bank 
Ownership 
Type 
Total 
Emp* 
Risk 
Division 
Emp* 
Credit 
Risk 
Emp** 
Total 
Risk 
Weighted 
Assets* 
Total 
Risk 
Weighted 
Credit 
Assets 
Total 
Deposits* 
KASB Bank Local 1321 16 12 45.745 42.492 43.807 
SC Bank Foreign 5042 148 91 180.268 136.300 206.958 
Askari Bank Local 7270 69 58 165.596 144.793 205.970 
Allied Bank Local 11690 351 315 238.437 193.031 328.875 
NIB Bank Foreign 6385 47 38 101.957 86.115 93.920 
MCB Bank Local 9397 410 380 337.417 243.712 367.604 
National 
Bank 
Government 16248 308 286 624.881 459.755 726.465 
Bank Alfalah Foreign 7462 130 106 213.840 185.162 324.760 
Faysal Bank Foreign 2042 117 99 103.420 83.013 123.655 
United Bank Foreign 8738 185 163 485.958 386.466 503.832 
B of 
Punjab*** 
Government 4811 100 85 172.345**
* 
151.000**
* 
195.073 
Habib Bank Local 13122 524 490 586.894 471.902 653.452 
11 
 
 
Table 2: Capital Adequacy Ratios of Banks in the Sample from 2005-2009. 
Year KASB SCB ACB ABL NIB MCB NIB BALF FBL UBL BOP HBL 
2005 9.34 6.45 11.3 12.17 11.61 12.54 11.51 8.66 12.01 9.26 12.78 9.93 
2006 8.95 8.14 12.37 12.8 17.44 18.65 16.5 9.48 11.42 11.1 10.09 12.81 
2007 12.18 9.45 13.2 10.26 3.33 16.73 18.05 9.85 10.27 10.32 9.69 11.6 
2008 9.05 9.99 12.1 10.9 19.52 16.28 16.9 8.03 10.84 9.96 1.92 12.33 
2009 3.53 11.57 13.5 13.47 19.53 19.07 17.23 12.46 12.36 13.18 7.68* 13.07 
 *Data Source: expected figure from the last available financial statements  
With the dual aims of obtaining a representative sample of the banking sector and analyzing the 
extent of the implementation of the Basel Accord, respondents from the included banks were surveyed 
as follows: 
 Two questionnaires were filled in by senior executives to gauge the extent of Basel Accord 
awareness at the higher management level.  
 One questionnaire was filled in by an executive of the Risk Management Division.  
 Two questionnaires were filled by a Branch Manager at each bank to gauge the extent of 
Basel Accord awareness at the lower management level. 
 A combination of 40 personal interviews and 20 telephone interviews were conducted in 
order to ensure the level and accuracy of survey responses. 
 
The survey highlights the following areas of interest: 
 Type of Bank: Are there differences in the implementation of Basel Accord between Public 
and Private Sector Banks in Pakistan?  
 Inclination of the Bank towards the Basel Accord 
 External Training: Has the bank initiated external training in relation to the Basel Accord? 
 Competence of Employees in Risk Management Department: The opinion of the 
respondent regarding the expertise of Employees in their Risk Management Department.  
 Effectiveness of Basel Plan Implementation: The opinion of the respondent regarding the 
effectiveness of the bank’s implementation plan.  
 Changes required in the System to ensure Basel Accord Compliance?  
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 Years Covered for Default time Series Data: The longer the period of time that data is 
available indirectly measures the compliance and inclination of the bank towards the Basel 
Accord and related standards. 
 Compliance with Market Discipline: The extent of compliance with disclosure 
requirements as per International Financial Reporting Standards and other disclosure 
requirements of Basel Accord. 
 Basel Customer Awareness: Are banks raising awareness amongst its customers regarding 
Basel Accord Compliance. Such steps are necessary in the light of Data Sharing, an issue 
highlighted in the Accord, and other international experiences of the financial crisis. 
Based upon our over-riding research questions we have developed the following hypotheses for 
analyzing deviations in the Pakistan banking sector for the Road Map for Basel Accord 
implementation in Pakistan. 
 H1: Pakistani banks are very much inclined to Basel Accord Implementation and they have 
taken a number of steps regarding policy making, up-grading of employee skills and 
technology for achieving the results. 
 H2: Progress on Basel Accord implementation is uniform across the banking sector and there 
are no significant differences in the steps taken by Public Sector and Private Sector banks.  
As detailed below in Sections 5.1-2 Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be tested in a statistically rigorous 
manner based on the data on survey responses. 
 
5. Statistical analysis of the survey data 
 
5.1 Measuring inclination towards the Basel Accord and potential barriers to 
implementation 
 
Our overall aims were to examine attitudes towards Basel Accord implementation plans 
across Pakistani Islamic banks and thus to determine which factors appear to be the biggest obstacles 
to implementation of the Basel Accord in these banks.  
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The questionnaire, see the Appendix, asks a number of general questions about the 
significance of the implementation of the Basel Accord (Q1-2) and further questions regarding overall 
attitudes to implementation (Q3-8) and a number of wider issues. These include questions regarding 
practical implementation of the Accord (Q10-11, Q17-20, Q31), knowledge and training of staff 
(Q12-14), risk management (Q15-16), whether or not practices currently comply with the Accord 
(Q21-22, Q32), further changes necessitated by the Accord (Q23-24), issues pertaining to data 
protection and security (Q25-29), minimal capital requirements (Q9, Q30), credit risk (Q34-37), 
market risk (Q38-40), operational risk (Q41-43), issues relating to the supervisory review process 
(Q44-48) and market discipline (Q49-Q52). 
Our first task in analysing the data was to produce a score measuring respondents’ attitude 
(positive or negative) towards implementation of the Basel Accord. To do this we analysed each 
individual’s answer to Questions 3-8. If they strongly agree or agree with the proposition they score 
1, if they strongly disagree or disagree  they score -1 and if they neither agree nor disagree they 
score 0. Next, if the proposition has negative implications regarding the implementation of the Basel 
Accord (Question 4) these scores are multiplied by -1. Finally, a score is allocated to an individual by 
adding their scores for each of the Questions 3-8. As constructed, high values indicate favourability 
towards implementation of the Basel Accord. Negative values indicate opposition. A value of zero 
indicates neutrality.     
Overall findings show that managers are on the whole favourable towards the implementation 
of the Basel Accord. A one-sample t-test (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989 Chapter 5) gives a t-statistic of 
4.502 on 59 degrees of freedom giving a p-value of 0.000. A ―smoothed histogram‖, kernel density 
estimate, (Venables and Ripley, 2002 Chapter 5) of the survey responses is shown in Figure 1 and 
reinforces the overall impression that managers are generally well-disposed towards implementation 
of the Basel Accord although a degree of opposition towards implementation is also apparent. As 
shown in Figure 1 there is a high probability (greater than 0.5) of obtaining a positive score and the 
modal value, or most commonly observed value, is clearly positive. In contrast, there is no statistically 
significant evidence for a difference between publicly and privately owned banks. An unpaired pooled 
two-sample t-test (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989 Chapter 6) gives a t-value of -1.597 and a p-value of 
0.116. Nonetheless, it does appear that privately owned banks may be better disposed towards the 
implementation of the Basel Accord than publicly owned banks. 
Having deduced that, overall, managers are favourably disposed towards the implementation 
of the Basel Accord we examine the survey data more fully in order to identify potential obstacles and 
the corresponding capacity building needs in the banks. We do this by regressing the sentiment scores 
against explanatory variables pertaining to the survey data (Q9-52) described above. Model selection 
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is performed using stepwise regression, based on sequential F-tests (Bingham and Fry, 2010 Chapter 
6), starting from the baseline model 
iiy   0 ,                                                                      (1)  
where yi is the score of the i
th 
survey respondent, 0  is the underlying average score and i  is a 
random error term.  In the sequel we fit the model 
iippii xxy   ,,110 ... ,                                                (2) 
where pxx ,...,1  are explanatory variables pertaining to the survey data. The results obtained for the 
final model selected are shown in Table 3. The R
2
 value is 0.82, suggesting that the model explains a 
substantial amount, 82%, of the variability in the scores of the survey respondents. The survey 
questions relating to the final model are shown below in Table 4. 
 
Figure 1: Smoothed histogram (kernel density estimate) of survey responses 
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Table 3: Regression Output for the final model 
Issue Variable Estimate Estimated 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
 Intercept -6.023 1.294 -4.658 0.000*** 
Credit Risk Number of years 
data on historical 
default (Q36a) 
0.870 0.105 8.299 0.000*** 
Local 
Development of 
credit risk 
models (Q37) 
3.753 1.391 2.698 0.010** 
Practical 
Implementation 
Issues 
Basel Accord 
Implementation 
Department set-
up (Q17) 
1.617 0.506 3.196 0.002** 
Q11 (Agree) 1.807 0.839 2.155 0.036* 
Minimal Capital 
Requirements 
Q9 (Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree) 
1.564 0.791 1.978 0.054 
Q9 (Agree) 1.769 
 
0.359 4.931 
 
0.000*** 
Data security Q27 (Agree) 1.340 0.451 2.974 0.005** 
Operational Risk Standardized 
Measurement 
Approach  (Q41) 
-1.553 0.628 -2.473 0.017* 
Unknown 
Measurement 
Approach (Q41) 
3.822 1.372 2.785 0.008** 
Q30b (Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree) 
-0.167 0.359 -0.467 0.643 
 Q30b (Agree) 1.912 0.647 2.956 0.005** 
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The results of the survey shown in Table 3 indicate highlight the following as potential 
limiting factors regarding implementation: Credit Risk, Practical Implementation Issues (IT and HR), 
Minimal Capital Requirements, Data Security and Operational Risk. The regression output in Table 3 
and the survey questions in Table 4 lead to the following interpretation.  
Results from the final regression model clearly highlight the importance of Credit Risk. As 
the number of years of data on historical default increases, the level of support for implementation of 
the Basel Accord increases. Similarly, local development of credit risk models is also associated with 
increased support for the Basel Accord. In sum, as the level of experience in Credit Risk increases the 
favourability towards implementation of the Basel Accord increases. 
 
Table 4: Survey questions pertaining to the final regression model 
Q9. Do you think that the Basel Accord will lead to Lower Capital Requirements for some Banks? 
Q11. Do you think Information Technology, and HR Problems might hinder implementation of the 
Basel Accord? 
Q16b. How many employees are engaged in the Risk Management Process in your Bank? 
(Operational Risk) 
Q17. Has your Bank set up any special Basel Accord Implementation Department? 
Q27. Do you think that your Bank should plan to resolve data protection issues under the Basel 
Accord by taking the consent declaration of its customers? 
Q30b. The current IT structure supports Basel Accord Requirements for Operational Risk? 
Q36a. How many years are covered by the time series that you have created for credit risk assessment 
(of default)? 
Q37. If you are using models for measuring economic capital for credit risk, how were these models 
developed? 
Q41. Which approach (es) are you planning to use for measuring operational risk in your bank? 
 
However, results also demonstrate that the Basel Accord raises serious questions regarding 
Operational Risk. As the number of employees working in Operational Risk increases, support for the 
Basel Accord decreases. Terms included in the final model suggest that less advanced approaches, 
Standardized and Basic approaches to modelling Operational Risk, are also associated with a less 
favourable view of the Basel Accord. Additional variables in the model (relating to Question 30) 
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indicate that whether or not the current IT structure supports the Basel Accord Requirements for 
Operational Risk is also significant. Minimal Capital Requirements constitute an important 
component of Operational Risk, with results also suggesting that significant numbers of managers 
think that the Basel Accord may actually lower capital requirements for some banks. Results suggest 
that managers who generally support implementation nonetheless appreciate wider issues that arise as 
part of the wider process. Managers who highlight the importance of data security (Q27) also tend to 
be more favourably inclined towards the Accord. Results also suggest that more favourable managers 
have successfully recognised that Information Technology and HR issues may hinder implementation 
of the Accord.  In addition, results also highlight other practical aspects of implementation of the 
Basel Accord. Managers tend to be more supportive of implementation if their bank has established a 
dedicated Basel Accord Implementation Department.  
In sum, results highlight the area of operational risk as a barrier to the implementation of the 
Basel Accord. Results also indicate that a number of further issues have only been addressed with a 
partial degree of success. These include modelling credit risk, having a dedicated Basel Accord 
implementation department, data security and IT and HR considerations. 
 
5.2 Testing for differences between Public and Private Sector banks 
 
In this subsection, our aim is to investigate factors which distinguish between private and publicly 
owned banks. In statistical terminology, we investigate which factors increase the probability of 
classifying a randomly chosen bank as privately owned. This is achieved by fitting a logistic 
regression model (McCullagh and Nelder (1989), Chapter 13; Bingham and Fry (2010), Chapter 8) 
and, as before, we regress observed outcomes against explanatory variables pertaining to the survey 
data (Q9-Q52) described above. 
 Let pi denote the probability that the i
th 
bank is privately owned. Let  iii pp  1log . We 
start with the benchmark model 
0 i ,                                                                      (3) 
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where 0  is related to the underlying average proportion of privately owned banks
3
 and there are no 
underlying features in the data which distinguish between privately owned and publicly owned banks. 
Using equation (3) as our benchmark model, in the sequel we fit the model  
ippii xx ,,110 ...   ,                                                (4) 
 where pxx ,...,1  are explanatory variables pertaining to the survey data. Model selection is performed 
using stepwise model selection based on 
2 likelihood-ratio tests for nested models (Bingham and 
Fry, 2010 Chapter 8). The results obtained for the final logistic regression model selected are shown 
in Table 5. The survey questions relating to the final model are shown below in Table 6. 
Although none of the variables included in the final model are individually statistically 
significant, as measured by univariate t-tests,  the 
2 -tests  clearly demonstrate that the aggregate 
effects of the variables is statistically significant. Results indicate a clear delineation between publicly 
and privately owned banks, with privately owned banks seemingly better prepared overall for Basel 
Accord implementation. Privately owned banks are more likely to have a highly functioning Basel 
Accord implementation department and are also more likely to have used additional amounts 
historical data in order to assess market risk. Once we control for other factors, results suggest that 
privately owned banks are less likely to have developed internal models for credit risk. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper addresses the important contemporary issue of the implementation of the Basel 
Accord in Pakistan. Adopting the Basel Accord is intended to safeguard the future stability of the 
world’s financial system and poses a number of specific challenges regarding implantation for both 
developing and emerging economies. Pakistan faces a number of unique challenges in this regard due 
to recent expansions in its banking sector and the fact that the rate at which the Basel Accord is being 
adopted in Pakistan lags behind that of other countries. This paper throws light on this and a number 
of related issues due to a combination of the novelty of the survey data from risk managers (at various 
levels of seniority across different institutions) in Pakistan banks coupled with a rigorous statistical 
analysis. 
                                                          
3
 If p is the underlying probability that a bank is privately owned,  pp  1/log0 . 
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Table 5. Final logistic regression model:  determinants of private ownership 
Coefficient Estimate Estimated 
Standard Error 
t-value p-value 
Intercept 19.01 5770.84 0.003 0.997 
Question 18 
(Neutral) 
35.77 6522.90 0.005 0.996 
Question 18 
(Agree) 
18.16 6656.54 0.003 0.998 
Internal model 
for credit risk 
-35.69 6302.67 -0.006 0.995 
No. of years 
historical data on 
market risk 
17.12 2533.97 0.007 0.995 
 
Table 6: Survey questions pertaining to the final logistic regression model 
Q18. Do you think that the Basel Accord Implementation Department is highly functional in your 
Bank? 
Q34. Have you developed methodology for identifying and measuring credit risk for your internal 
needs? 
Q39. How many years are covered by the time series that you have created for market risk 
assessment? 
 
The Basel Accord is generally well regarded due to its underlying aims of improved capital 
standards and administration coupled with a principled and scientific treatment of risk. This is 
reflected by results from the survey which show that the Basel Accord is generally viewed positively 
by managers (p=0.000). Results from the survey highlight operational risk as a key barrier to be 
overcome before implementation of the Basel Accord can be achieved. A number of further obstacles 
are highlighted, which, do seem to have been addressed with at least a partial degree of success by 
some of the banks in the study. These issues include advanced modelling of credit risk, having a 
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dedicated Basel Accord implementation department, data security and IT and HR considerations. 
Results also show that as the level of technical expertise increases, favourability towards 
implementation of the Basel Accord increases. 
The survey data also offer intriguing insights into potential differences between publicly 
owned and privately owned banks. Results suggest that in a number of ways privately owned banks 
appear to be better prepared for implementation. Privately owned banks are more likely to have both a 
highly functioning Basel Accord implementation department and to have used additional amounts 
historical data to assess market risk. Coupled with additional technical expertise, results suggest that 
privately owned banks may also be more favourably inclined towards implementation of the Basel 
Accord. Results in Section 5.1 are suggestive of a higher level of support for implementation amongst 
privately owned banks, although the observed sample difference lacks formal statistical significance 
(p=0.116).  
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Appendix: The Questionnaire 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL ACCORD 
 
Name of the bank:_________________________________________________________ 
Person in charge of completing the questionnaire: _______________________________ 
Position: ________________________________________________________________ 
Phone: __________________________________________________________________ 
Е-mail: _________________________________________________________________ 
Contact person: ___________________________________________________________ 
Position: ________________________________________________________________ 
Phone:_______ __________________________________________________________ 
Е-mail: _____________ ___________________________________________________ 
 
Objective: The objective of the Questionnaire is to examine Basel Accord implementation plans and 
to determine the corresponding capacity building needs in the Banks. 
 
 
Please check the response to indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements.  Make sure that you only check one response to each question.  Remember that there are 
no right or wrong answers.  Possible responses are: 
 
SA - strongly agree           A – agree                 N = neither agree nor disagree 
D – disagree                      SD – strongly disagree  
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Questionnaire about Standards of Basel Accord in Pakistani Banks 
1-Do you perceive that the implementation of Basel II in Pakistan is highly significant? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
2-Do you think that implementation of the Basel Accord will be highly significant in your Bank? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
3-Is your Bank highly inclined towards implementation of the Basel Accord? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
4-Do you think that Basel Accord Implementation will have more Problems than Advantages? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
5-Do you think that the Basel Accord will improve Risk Management Processes? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
6-Do you think that the Basel Accord will improve Corporate Governance? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
7-Do you think that the individual approach to Banks will be advantageous to the Banking System as 
a whole? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
8-Do you think that the use of internal risk models for capital calculation will be advantageous to the 
Banking System as a whole? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
9-Do you think that the Basel Accord will lead to Lower Capital Requirements for some Banks? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
10-Do you think that Basel Accord will lead to Higher Capital Requirements for some Banks which 
might eventually be a problem in the implementation of the Basel Accord? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
11-Do you think Information Technology, and HR Problems might hinder implementation of the 
Basel Accord? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
12-Do you think that the employees in your Bank have adequate knowledge of the standards of Basel 
Accord? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
13-Do you think that the education about the Basel Accord is being imparted adequately by your 
Bank to its employees? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
14-Has your Bank involved any external trainer for the training of Bank Staff in relation to the Basel 
Accord? 
Yes  No 
26 
 
15-Do you think that the employees involved in the risk management process are very proficient? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
16-How many employees are engaged in the Risk Management Process in your Bank? 
 Credit Risk 
 Operational Risk 
 Market Risk 
17-Has your Bank set up any special Basel Accord Implementation Department? 
Yes   No 
18-Do you think that the Basel Accord Implementation Department is highly functional in your Bank? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
19-Do you think that the staff responsible for implementation of the Basel Accord possesses highly 
professional skills to match international standards? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
20-Do you think that the plan for the implementation of the Basel Accord in your Bank is highly 
effective? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
21-If your Bank is a member of a Banking Group do you think that the reports being submitted in this 
regard comply with Basel Accord? 
Yes    No   Not Applicable 
22-If your Bank is a member of a Banking Group do you think that capital adequacy standards at an 
aggregate level comply with the requirements of Basel Accord? 
Yes    No   Not Applicable 
23-Do you think that updating IT systems would require higher costs to comply with Basel Accord in 
comparison with personnel training and outsourcing? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
24-Do you think that the Basel Accord changes the method your bank uses to collect data for its 
Decision making processes? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
25-Do you think that your Bank is collecting sensitive information like the ―personal traits‖ of its 
corporate and individual customers to meet the requirements of Core Principles of Basel Accord? 
Yes    No   Not Applicable 
26-Is your Bank willing to share data of large customers to settle their credit limits within banks or 
with other third parties if it will be allowed by the Banking Laws of your country? 
Yes    No   Not Applicable 
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27-Do you think that your Bank should plan to resolve data protection issues under the Basel Accord 
by taking the consent declaration of its customers? 
Yes    No   Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
 
 
28-Does your national legislation contain any specific provisions on Basel II and data protection or do 
you know about projects/drafts to do so?  
 
Yes    No   Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
 
29- Do you think that the current/drafted (if existing) national data protection legislation and banking 
legislation in your country is clear enough to enable your bank to solve data protection issues raised 
by the Basel Accord? 
 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
Questions about Pillar 1 Minimum Capital Requirements: 
30-The current IT structure supports Basel Accord Requirements for: 
Credit Risk :  SA                    A                    N                    D             SD 
Operational Risk :  SA                    A                    N                    D             SD 
Market Risk :  SA                    A                    N                    D             SD 
31-Do you think that there would be problems in integrating the systems required for Basel Accord 
Implementation into the mainstream systems of your Bank? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
32-Do you think that database design, internal models, and budgets are in close conformity as 
required by the Basel Accord? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
CREDIT RISK: 
33- Which approach (es) your bank is using for measuring credit risk in your bank? 
 
 Simplified Standardized Approach 
 Standardized Approach 
 Foundation Internal Ratings-Based Approach 
 Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach 
 Unknown 
34- Have you developed methodology for identifying and measuring credit risk for your internal 
needs? 
 
 No, we are only using the methodology prescribed by the State Bank of Pakistan 
 Yes, we are also using internally developed methodology 
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35-In case you are using internally developed methodology, how many risk categories do you use for 
ranking of debtors? 
 
 Up to 7 
 7 - 10 
 More than 10 
 
36-How many years are covered by the time series that you have created for credit risk assessment? 
 
 Default 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 – 3 years 
 3 – 5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 We have not created time series yet 
 
 Recovery rate 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 – 3 years 
 3 – 5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 We have not created time series yet 
 
 Other time series (specify name) 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 – 3 years 
 3 – 5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 We have not created time series yet 
 
37. If you are using models for measuring economic capital for credit risk, how were these models 
developed? 
 
 Locally (internally) developed 
 By the parent company or another member of the group but they are adopted to local conditions 
 By the parent company or another member of the group but they are not adopted to local 
conditions 
 Purchased  
 We are not using models for that purpose 
MARKET RISK: 
38-Which approach (es) and from when are you planning to use for measuring market risk in your 
bank? 
 Standardized Measurement Method: ____________ 
 Internal Models Approach: ___________________ 
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 Unknown 
 
39-How many years are covered by the time series that you have created for market risk assessment? 
 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 – 2 years 
 2 – 3 years 
 Over 3 years 
 We have not created time series yet 
 
40-If you are using models for measuring economic capital for market risk, how were these models 
developed? 
 Locally (internally) developed 
 By the parent company or another member of the group but they are adopted to local 
conditions 
 By the parent company or another member of the group but they are not adopted to local 
conditions 
 Purchased  
 We are not using models for that purpose 
OPERATIONAL RISK: 
41-Which approach (es) are you planning to use for measuring operational risk in your bank? 
 
 Basic Indicator Approach: _____________ 
 Standardized Approach: ____________ 
 Alternative Standardized Approach: ____________ 
 Advanced Measurement Approach: ____________ 
 Unknown 
 
42-How many years are covered by the time series that you have created for operational risk 
assessment? 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 – 2 years 
 2 – 3 years 
 Over 3 years 
 We have not created time series yet 
 
43-If you are using models for measuring economic capital for operation risk, how were these models 
developed? 
 Locally (internally) developed 
 By the parent company or another member of the group but they are adopted to local 
conditions 
 By the parent company or another member of the group but they are not adopted to local 
conditions 
 Purchased  
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 We are not using models for that purpose 
Pillar II Supervisory Review Process: 
44- The Supervisory Review guidelines currently formulated by Pillar II are helpful in improving 
supervisory review regime? 
SA                    A                    N                    D                      SD 
45-The supervisor has enough resources to comply with the requirement of four key principles of 
supervisory review process:  
Yes    No   Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
46-Which segments of Pillar I are difficult to monitored under the supervisory review process? 
 Credit Risk Methodologies 
 Operational Risk Methodologies 
 Market Risk Methodologies 
47-There is a need for additional legal processes within the national legal regime for appropriate 
implementation of the Basel Accord? 
Yes    No   Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
48-There are additional risks to be captured in Pillar I for capital adequacy requirements in order for 
more effective implementation of the Supervisory Review Process? 
Yes    No   Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
Part III Market Discipline: 
49-Do you think that your Bank adequately complies with the disclosure requirements of the Basel 
Accord regarding Market Discipline? 
Yes    No   Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
50-Do you consider national legislation to be hindrance in meeting disclosure requirements under the 
Basel Accord? 
 Yes    No   Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
51-Do you consider that the disclosure requirements under the Basel Accord regarding proprietary 
information can lead the Bank to a comparative disadvantage? 
Yes    No   Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
52-Has your bank devised any customer awareness strategies for complying with the Market 
Discipline Requirement of Pillar III? 
Yes    No   
